What's the optimal way to regulate cybersecurity for critical infrastructure operators? Should regulation follow the rules-based US style, the risk-based EU approach, or a hybrid? A cybersecurity economics model reveals that, depending on the combination of incentives, operators will eventually stop investing in risk assessment and care only about compliance (and vice versa), suggesting that pushing for more rules could have unintended consequences.
C ybercrime incidents are typically associated with fraudulent activities exploiting the insecurity of credit card payment schemes or online transactions. 1 When these occurrences a ect individual citizens, they're normally a ributed to the e ort of criminal hackers seeking to infect millions of computers to gain access to personal nancial information. 2, 3 Over time, the victims might change, but the crime's general modality monetization by transaction manipulation is inherently similar. A acks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) didn't originally have a speci c modality a ached to them, at least publicly, until 2009 and the emergence of Stuxnet. Targeted a acks from nation-states and criminal organizations have subsequently become more common or at least more widely reported as being persistent. ese activities, o en termed advanced persistent threats, have a ected many CNIs, from aviation to water processing utilities. Energy operators aren't exempt; Table 1 illustrates some examples of recent recorded a acks.
e increasing number of cybersecurity issues has now gained the a ention of public policymakers, with the US federal government (under Executive Order 13636) pu ing forward regulations aimed at protecting CNI cybersecurity and building a substantive technical framework. 4 e EU has followed suit, with a proposal for a speci c European Directive in this area. Managing and regulating cybersecurity issues is particularly relevant for CNI operators (CNIOs), the private and publicly traded enterprises in charge of transmitting electricity and producing and processing oil and gas. Hence, a natural research question arises: What's the best way to regulate cybersecurity for CNI providers? As with most important questions, the answer isn't straightforward, but a conceptual distinction that focuses on who's responsible for the choice of security measures can help.
At one extreme, which we call rules-based regulations, the policymaker mandates security provisions for CNIOs through detailed compliance requirements and by introducing penalties for noncompliance. On the opposite side, referred to as risk-based regulations, the policymaker intervenes with fines relating to a security breach but lets firms define their own security investments based on their investment profile, risk assessment analysis, and potential losses (including ultimately the loss of license to operate). So in a pure rules-based system, only the policymaker can perform the risk assessment, cast security measures into low-level rules, and audit their implementation, fining anyone in violation for noncompliance. If all rules are met but a breach nonetheless occurs, CNIOs aren't liable. In contrast, in a pure risk-based system, the CNIO itself is responsible for performing a risk assessment, decides lowlevel countermeasures, and isn't audited. Penalties are imposed in the event of a successful attack that causes disruptions (the UK regulatory system works in this fashion). Real-world regulations are usually a hybrid of these two extremes, and a CNIO's operational implementation of security controls is a function of the risk environment and actual regulations.
During the Socio-Economics Meets Security (SEC-ONOMICS; www.seconomics.org) project, we developed several cybersecurity public policy models that explicitly capture the hybrid nature of the regulations oscillating between risk-and rules-based systems. We calibrated and validated our regulatory models in the field with the support of National Grid, an electricity provider that owns and operates the UK's electricity and gas transmission networks and provides gas distribution for half the union. It also owns and operates electricity and gas transmission networks, as well as distribution networks, in a significant proportion of the northeastern US. Due to this coverage of utility delivery services in the UK and US, National Grid's security function deals with every aspect of both types of regulatory regimes, providing us with a fruitful case study opportunity. Our model's key feature is that it can help us determine whether a rules-or a risk-based regulation obtains the best social optimum for public policymakers, even under the assumption that CNIOs pursue their own commercial interests as privately owned companies. From our parametric specification, the model predicts that substantial variations in the regulatory system could be appropriate in different conditions. For instance, the number of operators, the effectiveness of audits, the appropriateness of requirements, and attack costs all influence the optimal outcome. What's particularly interesting is a qualitative phenomenonthe presence of discrete phase transitions. Different types of regulatory incentives dramatically shift CNIO behavior-and not necessarily in the anticipated manner.
Challenges in CNI Cybersecurity
CNIOs have a variety of assets with differing levels of criticality to the ongoing functionality and profitability of their operations. In the case of electricity transmission, these assets can include the energy management system and its software along with other essential operational technology in the field such as local substation control systems. Industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems control additional critical functions and operations that CNIOs are responsible for. SCADA systems' role, for example, is to take information from multiple remote sensors and stations and feed it into a central control room, giving operators full visibility of the entire network. An ICS linked to the SCADA system through both automated and manual controls helps operators perform various actions and control any changes from the information collated and organized in the SCADA system. Examples of ICS and SCADA systems include Table 1 helped sharpen the senses of CNIO security teams and their boards, but serious interest in protecting CNI started with the Stuxnet incident in 2009, the first major cyberattack on an ICS or SCADA system. Stuxnet was a piece of bespoke malware that targeted Iran's nuclear program with the specific purpose of corrupting the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC SCADA system that controlled the centrifuges. A key feature of the Stuxnet malware was its ability to intercept and then alter sensor readings from the centrifuges to the control room and the commands being sent back without the operators realizing that anything untoward had occurred. This resulted in a malfunction of the centrifuges and batches of uranium being ruined, which was the attack's ultimate goal.
Stuxnet-like malware is highly dangerous because it's capable of both affecting computer systems across a network and causing physical damage to critical equipment by directly attacking the ICS and SCADA systems protecting it. Furthermore, ICS and SCADA systems traditionally have a far longer life cycle (15 to 20 years) than standard IT equipment, meaning that most of them were built when information and cybersecurity weren't considered important corporate issues. Even today, ICS and SCADA vendors are still relatively security immature, which makes securing these systems a difficult proposition for CNIOs. 5 Although regulators realize this, 6 they often have difficulty fully comprehending and appreciating the challenges CNIOs must overcome to secure their legacy ICS and SCADA systems. Major economic drivers create additional obstacles-for example, in the EU, CNIOs are heavily price regulated due to the energy transmission industry's monopolistic (or even oligopolistic) nature. Therefore, it can be difficult for CNIOs to justify significant security budgets to a regulator tasked with keeping prices as low as possible. In the US, price competition for a compliance target between a large number of operators returns essentially the same effect. This is a key reason why cybersecurity budgets in many CNIOs aren't as high as other similarly sized commercial organizations.
Different Approaches to CNI Cybersecurity Regulations
So, should CNIOs in charge of electricity transmission be regulated based on a risk-or a rules-based regime? Which market conditions or attacker model justifies one choice over the other or suggests a mixture of both?
In the US, National Grid must adhere to a rulesbased system run by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), an independent organization that provides guidelines and standards for electricity transmission operators in North America and enforces them on behalf of the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). NERC monitors the status of various elements of the power distribution system (including cybersecurity assets) using the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) reliability standards. Each regulated entity must provide compliance reports against the CIP standard on a yearly basis and is audited every three years. The first CIP standard mandating asset identification (CIP-002 v1) was drafted in 2006; version 2 went into effect in 2010.
In contrast, most cybersecurity regulation in CNI industries across Europe isn't compliance based. In the UK, National Grid holds a license to transmit electricity that's granted by the UK government's Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The headline duty of the transmission license holder in the Electricity Act of 1989 states:
It shall be the duty of the holder of a licence authorising him to transmit electricity to develop and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of electricity transmission.
The Electricity Act doesn't specifically require the license holder to be "secure," but not having relevant cybersecurity controls in place could jeopardize electricity transmission in the face of cyberattacks and therefore the license itself. However, the operator is free to decide how it will ensure that it's cybersecure; regulation is risk based. Table 3 illustrates the difference in regulations between some countries in Europe and the US that we obtained from a survey of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) members.
Regimes can change over time-for example, the German regulatory system for securing critical industries is currently based on high-level principles, but the German Federal Ministry for the Interior is establishing a requirement for energy Transmission Operators to pass the ISO27001 certification process by 30 January 2018 and to document this to the German national regulator. Part of the new regulation includes security audits and the regulator's "right to inspect." Although the ISO27001 standard includes a risk management framework, several security controls are specific and effectively mandatory, representing a significant jump from a risk-based to a primarily rulesbased regulatory system.
The European Commission has also put forward the European Network and Information Security (NIS) directive to ensure that CNIOs meet appropriate IT security standards, share information about threats, and report security breaches consistently across Europe. 6 Because cybersecurity maturity varies widely across EU member states, the proposed mandatory requirements in the NIS directive have been received with the full spectrum of responses, from those being in favor of it, claiming that it would push CNIOs to do more and thus increase overall security maturity, to those expressing concerns that it could stall existing goodwill between governments and CNIOs and drive CNIOs to hide or tone down security events for fear of further repercussions.
Current Security Economics Models and CNI Scenarios
Traditional security economics models capture attacker-target interactions as Bayesian games, with early work building on the weakest link game, which looks at games where the level of security is determined by the least secure element, agent, or node in a network. 7 Neal Fultz and Jens Grossklags use the classic paradigm of defenders and attackers, playing a one-period game under various assumptions for attacker objectives and defender constraints. 8 Earlier papers use a slightly simplified attack-defense model to determine the optimal allocation of liability to vendors for software patching. 9 A similar single-period game elucidates the optimal policy for software vulnerability disclosures. 10 The behavioral aspects of attacker-target interactions can also determine how much information is optimal to share. 11 Why is it important to differentiate between CNI firms, which are regulated in some manner, and those in other less-regulated sectors, such as technology and retail? The answer lies primarily in the systemic risk that accompanies the "critical good" that the CNIO is providing.
A European country (or a US or Canadian state) usually has one bulk electricity transmitter; geographical spacing restricts competition. CNIOs are run as "normal" firms, often quoted on the stock exchange and thus running with the same overarching objective as any other firm: maximizing shareholder value. Corporate officers who make decisions for a firm would be expected to exhibit risk aversion in acting for themselves, 12 but the economic theory of the firm suggests that corporate officers should act on their shareholders' behalf and hence be risk neutral. 13 However, the natural limitations in the provision of bulk electricity transmission makes the provision of the good (that is, the transmission of electricity) a de facto local or nationwide monopoly; the result is a risk-neutral, rent-seeking monopolist in charge of a risky yet critical service to society. To avoid exploiting its citizens, a government agency normally regulates in some way the degree of investments a CNIO can make and limits the charges its customers must pay. The "price cap" model in the UK sets a maximum cost of the good; in the US, a "rate-ofreturn" regulation limits utilities to a maximum rate of return on capital for investors.
Hence the intrinsic setting of electricity transmission complicates the standard attack-defense game in several ways. Unlike in the standard situation in which a firm must defend itself against attackers and bear any 
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financial losses on its own, the major costs of successful attacks on a public utility often aren't fully borne by the CNIO, as the manager of the firm, but by the public at large. To ensure that a CNIO properly invests in security provisions, policymakers must balance the resources they allow the operator to extract from consumers, the minimal mandated and audited investment, and the penalties and fines for poor service in the event of a successful attack. From this point forward, we consider the CNIO choices to be that of "the firm" and use these terms interchangeably. Given the CNIO's privatized status, any financial transfer (like a subsidy or license to charge a rent) from a rate-setting arrangement to the firm will need to provide a maximum expected surplus for shareholders subject to future risk outcomes. Divergent opinions on the likelihood and impact of future successful attacks will naturally lead to tension between policymakers and CNIOs about resource allocation-for example, if a regulator is uninformed about security costs and is convinced by the operator to have a large transfer of investment, but then caps the transfer to shareholders, the operator will act in an inefficient manner via the Averch-Johnson effect, 14 whereby activity is essentially gold plated to increase turnover, a percentage of which is usually transferred to the CNIO managers.
Finding the appropriate discount rate for future losses in electricity transmission could involve the same problems found in the economics of climate change, which involve proper identification of the long-term social discount factor, something which is very problematic in economics. Larger-scale ecosystems (such as the Internet or long-distance electricity grids) are usually assumed to require longer-term planning (and therefore low discount rates to determine their net present value). Social planners might want to manage bulk electricity transmission risks over a longer, more sustainable time horizon, so they'll set their discount rates lower than the normal rate of return on investments determined by a market-driven CNIO. However, this means that each participant in the ecosystem will struggle against the costs of risk amortization that they believe to be unfair, given their own time preferences.
A Game-Theoretic Model of Subsidies and Incentives
To differentiate regulatory systems from a conceptual perspective, we introduce the institutional analysis and development (IAD) model suggested by Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom; 15 similar frameworks with a rigorous mathematical underpinning have been applied elsewhere. 16 The IAD framework extracts key features of the institutional design narrative from the hundreds pages of NERC/FERC regulations and European government acts to help build a mathematical model based on game theory.
Crawford and Ostrom introduced the notion of a policy action arena, the interaction domain (in this case, cybersecurity regulation) in which we observe rules, norms, and strategies. Each macroconcept is formally described by a set of refined concepts: ■ attribute (A) is the individual or organization to which the policy institution statement applies; ■ deontic (D) prescriptive operator describes what the institutional statement permits, obliges, or forbids; ■ intention (I) describes the goal or action of the statements to which the corresponding deontic refers; ■ condition (C) specifies when and where the aim is appropriate; and ■ or-else (O) is the punishment action when a rule isn't adhered to.
For rules, the entire syntax is valid (ADICO), but for norms, only attribute, deontic, intention, and condition apply (ADIC). Strategies include only attribute, intention, and condition (AIC).
The difference between the two regulatory systems is in the entity setting the norms and or-else punishments. For risk-based systems, this entity determines the specificity of operational norms, but the public body sets the overarching principles with either explicit (fines for poor or absent service) or implicit (loss of license) punishments. In a rules-based system, the public body sets and audits operational norms, determining them from its own principles. Hybrid systems vary in the degree of discretion the service provider has in setting operational norms and the specificity of audit and a priori fines for audit breaches, relative to fines for disruption of provision.
To build a model, we assume that the policymaker is a single coherent decision maker, as is the CNIO. This is appropriate in characterizing EU and US monopoly CNI situations. Another assumption is that CNIOs are responsive to policy actions, albeit not necessarily in the way the policymaker expects. A CNIO can decide its level of investment in rules compliance I rules and level of investment in risk-based security I risk . Intuitively, this level of investment is the response to incentives set out by the policymaker. Thus, compliance investment, although it might have the effect of reducing risk, isn't by itself classified as contributing to risk-based investment.
The policymaker sets policies represented mathematically as pairs of functions describing the strength of incentives for security compliance (the result of failing an audit failure Audit ) and strength of incentives for riskbased security behavior (punitive damages as a consequence of successful attacks). The policymaker has a further action available: the subsidy S allocated to the CNIO. The precise form of this subsidy-for example, a consumer fee with a price or rate-of-return cap, or a direct transfer of funds-isn't relevant.
A specific security aspect to consider as well is the presence of rational adversaries who benefit from security breaches. In some models, breaches are taken to arise stochastically, as though generated by some partially unknown process. In the present model, the CNIO and attacker simultaneously anticipate and react to each other's choices, with the attacker choosing a level of attack intensity A. These actors can be characterized with the following risk-neutral utility functions:
(1)
Equation 1 represents the firm's payoff; we can see that it receives a subsidy S and deterministically makes investments I rules and I risk . When the firm is audited and is found wanting in terms of compliance, it receives a fine failure Audit (I rules ). We assume that this function is hyperbolic: it decreases with I rules , but the marginal effectiveness of additional investments decreases for large investments. This assumption is typical for economics models of choice under uncertainty, from public policy to finance.
The firm, by assumption, chooses an optimal level of I rules at a maxima rather than as a boundary condition from an arbitrary budget constraint. For the stochastic loss resulting from the term (fines + losses) × Pr Attacks (A, I rules , I risk ), we make a similar assumption: the probability of successful attacks is hyperbolic in terms of I rules and I risk for a given level of A, and obviously increases with attack intensity A. Therefore, probability of success decreases with the total amount of investment, with the marginal effectiveness of each additional dollar diminishing in large investments. Consequently, the firm will choose an optimal level of effort I risk , and the contribution of random losses to the choice of I rules will attain a unique maxima.
Equation 2 represents the attacker's payoff. We assume that there's a reward and a cost of effort (rolled into value A). Given the previous assumptions on Pr Attacks (A, I 1 , I 2 ) , the attacker will also have an optimal unique intensity for attacks, determining the number of attempts. The major issue is the lack of empirical measures of A and reward. At present, we can only view attacks that have occurred, so we don't know the full set of available attacks or have a measure of their difficulty. However, we can treat the unknown parameters as variables for parameter explorations, which provides us with the policy area of interest.
Equation 3 presents the policymaker's risk-neutral expected payoff, where W is wealth and S is the amount allocated. The policymaker receives verifiable assurance of investment from the firm by the expenditure of I rules ; this level of assurance will be proportional to the level of the firm's overall investment. The lack assurance (I rules ) captures this effect: as the level of I rules increases, lack assurance (I rules ) converges to zero; as I rules tends to zero, the term lack assurance (I rules ) tends to a fixed value that represents the policymaker's overall concern in the absence of verifiable information from the firm. The term damages × Pr Attacks (A, I rules , I risk ) denotes the expected degree of damage to society from attacks. It isn't directly affected by policymaker action, but it's indirectly affected by the choice of function failure Audit (I rules ) and the level of fines the policymaker imposes on the firm. We denote these levels as incentive for both risk-and rules-based security investment.
When designing such an attack and defense model, we must ensure that we separately measure each agent (attacker, firm corporate officer, and policymaker). In the most general specification, the common terms (subsidy S and investments I rules and I risk ) will have multipliers in front of them to ensure that they're evaluated according to each actor's unit of account and level of risk aversion. For example, the policymaker might value the public subsidy S more than the firm receiving it when it's obtained from taxation.
A more general solution to the public policy game would be to build a complex game with three types of players. Our simpler and more effective alternative is to treat the attacker-target interaction as a subgame with a Nash equilibrium for a given set of incentives. The policy maker then optimizes the incentives considering the solution of the Nash equilibrium. A detailed mathematical analysis can be found in SECONOMICS Deliverable D6.4 (see www.seconomics.eu).
Policy Implications for CNIO Security
Our models have been built, calibrated, and refined in an iterative process that involves security leaders in the energy sector. It took more than three years and 17 dedicated meetings with the ENTSO-E cybersecurity group, the NGRID security leadership, national regulators, and other stakeholders to understand the high-level characteristics of the model and, above all, to trust its fidelity so that its predicted answers could be trusted as well. Without such a process, it would be impossible to convince a CISO or a government
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to alter the balance between risk-and rules-based approaches. Several policy implications stem from this analysis.
The interesting phenomenon is that the incentive choices by the policymaker divide the policy arena into regions of behavior for CNIOs and attackers. (1) to (2) and from (4) to (5), but because CNIOs only move along the budget constraints, the actual effect is that (4) stops doing its security analysis and only cares about compliance (6) . Figure 1a illustrates our phase diagram. If incentives for rules-based compliance are massive, attackers will eventually be priced out (blue line on the right).
If incentives for risk-based self-assessment increase and incentives for rules-based compliance decrease (CNIOs shirk audits or the fines aren't high enough), the regulator should switch to risk-based regulatory regimes (the red boundary) so that companies make their own security risk assessment and invest accordingly. The countries listed in Table 2 are positioned according to the incentive structure surveyed by the ENTSO-E cybersecurity group. Given the presence of the no-attack region, policymakers would intuitively like to push CNIOs on the right by adding more rules. Unfortunately, the phase transition diagram must be intersected with the firm's actual financial means, the solid blue line in Figure 1b , often capped by the regulator itself. Therefore, the push for more rules might have unintended consequences: instead of increasing security, the additional rules (such as adding the obligation to meet the NIS Directive to the CNIO in (1) or the additional compliance of NIS and ISO27001 for the German operator in (4)) will push firms to disinvest in security measures identified as critical and potentially move down toward the compliance-only region.
The phase diagram's qualitative structure doesn't change with model parameters, but the optimal policy choice's precise value and budget constraints depend on them. For example, the rate of mitigation returns on investment in rule compliance impacts the green line's position, so different estimations by the firm and the policymaker could lead to different expectations of policy outcomes and potentially damaging misunderstandings. Policymakers and CNIOs should have a shared view of the outcome from policy.
If we look at the US, nearly 400 firms provide bulk electricity transmission services across the continent. Their size varies from large, risk-mature, multinational corporations (such as National Grid) to very small firms operating in sparsely populated areas. Such variation determines a corresponding variation in time horizons, risk preferences, and associated investment profiles. Externalities created by underinvestment can create sizable costs for other CNIOs and the wider public. In this instance, NERC-CIP regulations provide state and federal public policy planners a rules-based system designed to provide assurance on minimum levels of crosssectional protection. An interesting issue in this context that we investigate in a companion paper on airport security is whether applying the same type of regulation to operators of different sizes might raise fairness issues. 17 In the EU context, most of the bulk electricity transmission operators are national entities. The need for coordinated regulatory regimes, NERC style, appears to be fundamentally different as externalities are smaller in this environment. If the interconnection between European countries and the number or maturity of operators change significantly in the future, this approach should be reconsidered.
O ur model validation meetings encouraged a lot of discussions and reflections:
■ The effectiveness of rules-based regulation depends on how well-informed the regulator is about asset security. If IT architectures differ across each organization, it will be difficult for a regulator to precisely state which assets are subject to security requirements, which could lead to CNIOs exploiting gaps in the regulation and substituting regulated assets (subject to security rules) with unregulated ones, thereby lowering overall system security. ■ A regulator's payoff depends on what it values as important. If a regulator values assurance-that is, demonstration of security rule compliance-its payoff will be higher the more stringent the rules and the audits are. This might be particularly important if budget constraints are tight and the risk of ending in the no-action zone is high. If regulators value the absence of security incidents, then making the rules more rigid will yield only a small benefit (see Figure 1b) . ■ Cultural attitudes vary, which can have a significant impact on how firms and CNIOs react to security regulation-or its absence. In some jurisdictions, CNIOs respond in a collaborative manner to the regulator and government agencies to develop a security posture that everyone buys into. In some countries, CNIOs choose to do very little in terms of security with similar regulations in place. This is causing regulators to reevaluate their approach, particularly in the EU.
Many security leaders involved in this work thought that a mixed regulatory response could be implemented. Specifically, rules could apply to CNIOs that were less security mature, and CNIOs above a certain maturity threshold (those with an established risk management and mitigation framework) would be subject to a risk-based regulatory framework. In this way, the rules-based regulation would bring less mature organizations above the bar and risk-based regulation would let mature organizations innovate and lead the industry. Identifying the maturity threshold is an interesting issue for future work.
